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Chapter V 
The Commander's Handbook on the 
Law of Naval Operations 
and the Contemporary Law of the Sea 
by 
A. v. Lowe* 
T he Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,1 issued by the United States Department of the Navy in July 1987, is a model of clarity 
and conciseness. Given the audience for which it was intended, it is 
resoundingly successful in explaining the intricacies of the law. Its clear and 
authoritative style, however, sometimes conceals the controversial nature of 
some of the statements which it includes. It is the purpose of this paper to 
review the Handbook, discussing the more controversial pronouncements and 
setting it against the background of the contemporary, and sometimes 
unsettled, Law of the Sea. The comments made are in no sense intended as 
a criticism of the drafting of the Handbook as an exposition of the United States' 
view of international law, which could scarcely be bettered. They merely 
point out some of the difficulties which attend that view of the law, which 
for the most part could not reasonably be canvassed in the Handbook itself. 
The comments are not an exhaustive catalogue of the cases where the 
legislation or views of third States or commentators differ from that of the 
United States, but they are illustrative of the kinds of questions which might 
arise from strict adherence to the account given in the Handbook. 
The Handbook is divided into two parts, The Law of Peacetime Naval 
Operations and the Law of Naval Warfare, which will be discussed in turn. 
First, however, it is necessary to deal with certain general issues raised in 
the Preface to the Handbook. 
The Handbook claims disarmingly to set forth "general guidance," and not 
to be "a comprehensive treatment of the law" or "a substitute for the 
definitive legal guidance provided by judge advocates and others responsible 
for advising commanders on the law."2 However, while there are certainly 
detailed points of interpretation upon which the Handbook is not to be taken 
as a definitive guide, it is plain that the Handbook is intended to represent 
United States Navy thinking on the broad lines of international law, and hence 
to some extent will operate as a constraint upon those who give more detailed 
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advice. For instance, the Preface lists only two sources of international law: 
custom and treaties. There is no suggestion of recourse to resolutions of 
international organizations for the determination of what international law 
might be. This is unfortunate since, quite apart from the crucial importance 
of such resolutions in the particular context of the legality of operations on 
the deep sea-bed, resolutions adopted by bodies such as the International Civil 
Aviation Organization are of great significance in the adumbration of the 
law concerning other maritime zones of more immediate concern to naval 
commanders. 
Moreover, the definition of customary international law given in the 
Preface, though according closely with classical formulations which treat 
customary law as a homogeneous body of law applicable to all States, gives 
no sense of the decisive importance of persistent objection and acquiescence 
in State practice, which can, respectively, except States from the binding 
force of emergent norms of customary international law or bind them to 
acceptance of norms which command less than general acceptance in State 
practice.3 Given that the United States persistently objected to territorial sea 
claims in excess of three miles until its conditional acceptance of wider claims 
in 1983 or SO,4 and that some of the statements in the Handbook amount to 
novel interpretations of the law of the sea, persistent objection and 
acquiescence remain important considerations in the accurate determination 
of the rules of international law applicable in any concrete dispute. 
The Law of Peacetime Naval Operations 
1. Legal Divisions of the Oceans and Airspace. The first chapter in this part 
of the Handbook deals with the legal divisions of the oceans and airspace, and 
it begins with a summary of the law concerning baselines. Two points call 
for comment. First, while acknowledging the propriety of straight baselines 
drawn along coastlines where it is impracticable to utilize the low-water 
mark, as where the coastline is deeply indented or fringed by islands,S the 
Handbook notes that "the United States, with few exceptions, does not employ 
this practice and interprets restrictively its use by others."6 It is true that 
the restrictions on the use of straight baselines set out in the 1958 Territorial 
Sea Convention were recently reaffirmed in the 1982 Convention, and there 
was no significant support at UNCLOS III for any substantial relaxation of 
those restrictions. On the other hand, State practice is clearly moving towards 
a liberal interpretation of the circumstances in which straight baselines can 
be used. A recent study7 sets out straight baseline claims made by 46 States, 
including many (such as those made by Algeria, Burma, Colombia, Cuba, 
Ecuador, France, Guinea, Iran, Italy, Kenya, Madagascar, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Senegal, Spain and Vietnam) which are by no means easy to 
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reconcile with the conventional and customary law criteria for the use of 
such baselines. 
It is understood that the United States has protested against some of these 
claims, reserving its legal rights. There is a risk of the United States being 
held to have acquiesced in the validity of other claims, although since the 
acquiescence only arises from silence in circumstances which demand a protest 
because they affect the actual (as opposed to the abstract) interests of a State, 
this possibility is theoretical rather than real. However, there is a more 
insidious danger. If the pattern of liberal use of baselines persists and spreads, 
a view might emerge that it represents either an agreed interpretation of the 
conventional rules or a development in the customary law, in either case 
allowing such claims. This gives rise to complex questions of treaty law 
concerning the ability of what may ultimately be a minority (perhaps a small 
minority) of parties to hold out against an interpretation of a multilateral 
treaty adopted by the other parties. This problem is compounded by the 
difficult question whether the boundaries of a State, determined inter alia by 
its baseline, can differ vis-a-vis different States. While it would probably 
overstate the case to say that the United States is in danger of having its legal 
rights eroded by this development in State practice, there is at least a cause 
for concern here which should be recognized. 
The second point concerns claims to historic bays, such as the Libyan claim 
to the Gulf of Sirte which has occasioned difficulties in the past.8 The Handbook 
states that "[t]he United States has taken the position that an actual showing 
of acquiescence by foreign nations in such a claim is required, as opposed 
to a mere absence of opposition,"9 if the historic claim is to be valid. This 
is controversial for two reasons. First, it might be said that it is not the 
acquiescence of foreign nations, but only of the United States, which need 
be shown: if the United States had acquiesced in the claim, it would be bound 
to accept its validity, whether or not other States had acquiesced in it. 
Acquiescence by the United States is, however, unlikely. In the Gulf ofSirte, 
for instance, the United States put beyond doubt its rejection of the Libyan 
claims by asserting its freedom to use the disputed waters as high seas. 
Secondly, the requirement of acquiescence, as opposed to the mere absence 
of protest, is itself less clearly settled than the Handbook might imply. The 
International Court in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case suggested that the 
general toleration of a notorious claim-the mere absence of protest-is 
enough to render the claim valid, and controversy over the matter is alive 
in academic circles.lO This point might also be argued in relation to straight 
baseline systems, which are simply a means of defining those waters which 
could become internal waters of a State by way of historic title even if the 
original drawing of the baseline was unlawful. Here again is a possibility that 
the Handbook points to in the rejection of certain maritime claims which might 
be held by an international tribunal to be opposable to the United States. 
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The Handbook turns next to the definition of the various maritime zones 
which might be claimed by States. Although these definitions are not of 
central importance, the rights and duties of States within the zones being dealt 
with in more detail elsewhere in the Handbook, it is worth noting that some 
of the definitions are questionable. Paragraph 1.5 of the Handbook is headed 
"International Waters," and covers the contiguous zone, Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ), high seas and security zones. The contiguous zone is stated, with 
an impeccable adherence to the wording of the 1958 and 1982 Conventions ,11 
to be the zone within which a State may prevent and punish infringements 
of its customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws and regulations that occur 
within its territory or territorial sea. That definition is, however, arguably 
too restrictive. Many State claims to contiguous zones assert the right to 
punish not only infringements committed within the territory or territorial 
sea of the State, but also infringements committed within the contiguous zone 
itself; in short, they claim both jurisdiction to enforce and jurisdiction to 
prescribe in the contiguous zone. However, the terms of the conventional 
definition adopted in the Handbook, whether construed literally or in the light 
of the travaux preparatoires of article 24 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, 
grant only jurisdiction to enforce in the contiguous zone.12 Moreover, the 
list of interests which may be protected in the contiguous zone, which is 
limited to customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary matters, sits awkwardly 
with United States judicial practice. In cases such as the Tairo Maru13 and 
Gonzalez,14 United States courts have taken a liberal view of the rights of 
coastal States to exercise jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea in what may 
loosely be termed as the contiguous zone, extending in terms of subject matter 
beyond the limits laid down in the 1958 and 1982 Conventions. It has, however, 
to be said that the more conservative line taken in the Handbook accords with 
that taken by the Geographer of the United States Department of State.1S 
In particular, the refusal of the Handbook to admit the validity of contiguous 
zones for security purposes16 is consistent with the views of the Geographer.17 
Perhaps the most significant divergence from the wording of the 
international conventions in this section of the Handbook concerns the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). While the description of these 200-mile 
zones as "resource-related zones" might be regarded as a reasonable 
simplification of their nature, the description of the rights of third States in 
the zone is more controversial. It is stated that "in the EEZ all nations enjoy 
the right to exercise the traditional high seas freedoms of navigation and 
overflight, of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and of all other 
traditional high seas uses by ships which are not resource related. "18 That 
is not what the 1982 Convention says. Article 58 of the Convention expressly 
ascribes to third States in the EEZ only 
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[T]he freedoms referred to in article 87 [on the freedoms of the high seas] of navigation 
and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other 
internationally lawful uses of the seas related to these freedoms, such as those associated 
with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible 
with the other provisions of this Convention. 
The controversy centers upon the legality of activities such as weapons testing 
and naval exercises, and the laying of submarine monitoring systems (such 
as the SOSUS chains) in the EEZ, without the permission of the coastal State. 
One view, advanced in the Handbook, is that all such traditional high seas 
activities fall within the concept of "other internationally lawful uses of the 
seas related to" the freedom of navigation and pipe- and cable-laying set out 
in article 58, and that they are therefore lawful if committed in the EEZ of 
a third State, even if the State objects to such activities.19 That view is not 
shared by all States. For example, Brazil, Cape Verde and Uruguay have 
asserted that various military activities, such as exercises involving the use 
of weapons, may not be conducted within the EEZ without coastal State 
consent.20 States taking this position might argue that weapons testing and 
the deployment of underwater monitoring systems are neither expressly listed 
in article 58 as specific "high seas" freedoms preserved in the EEZ nor 
included within the category of "other internationally lawful uses of the seas 
related to" the specified freedoms. Naval exercises in an area of EEZ 
involving the use of guns, bombs and rockets, for example, might be said 
to be essentially different from and unrelated to the freedom of navigation, 
as may the sowing of unarmed mines.21 The laying of SOSUS chains which 
monitor shipping movements in the area might equally be said to be distinct 
from normal pipe- and cable-laying activities, where the pipes and cables are 
used for transportation across the zone in question rather than for the 
collection of intelligence from it. Furthermore the exclusive right, of the 
coastal state, under article 60 of the 1982 Convention, to authorize and 
construct installations and structures in the EEZ which may interfere with 
the exercise of its rights in the zone offers an alternative basis for coastal 
interference. It might be said, for instance, that a SOSUS chain which 
stretches across the EEZ of a State so as to make it impossible for coastal 
State naval vessels to put to sea without detection by a third State interferes 
with the right of the coastal State to police and defend the waters adjacent 
to its coast. Finally, the coastal State might claim that any of the foregoing 
arguments are sufficient to create a doubt as to the respective scope of coastal 
and third State rights, and that a proper interpretation of article 59 (not 58) 
of the 1982 Convention resolves that issue "on the basis of equity and in the 
light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective 
importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the 
international community as a whole." 
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The merits of these opposing arguments have been canvassed elsewhere,22 
and that task will not be repeated here. It should be clearly stated, however, 
that the views ascribed to Cape Verde have been expressed only by a tiny 
minority of States, and have been plainly rejected by rather more States 
(including the United States in the statement made at the signing of the Final 
Act of UNCLOS III)23 and also by the overwhelming majority of 
commentators. It is, of course, entirely proper that the Handbook should refrain 
from raising what might reasonably be considered to be specious C?bjections 
to the United States' view. However, it is equally proper that arguments 
which may yet be deployed against the United States should be noted in a 
commentary on the Handbook. If these disagreements over the interpretation 
of the 1982 Convention were to be resolved, that would do no more than 
clear the way for the even more difficult question of the extent to which 
the details of the Convention's provisions on the EEZ and other matters (and 
in particular article 59) have entered into customary law. The only point being 
made here is that the question of third-State rights in the EEZ is not quite 
as cut and dried as might appear from the Handbook. 
Briefly, the Handbook adopts the definition of the continental shelf set out 
in the 1982 Convention, according to which coastal State rights over the shelf 
extend, broadly speaking, to the limits of the geological continental margin 
or to 200 miles from the baseline, whichever is farther.24 The provision is 
significant for many States, notably in the Pacific Ocean, whose geological 
shelves are much narrower than 200 miles. Some might question whether 
contemporary customary law does yet follow the 1982 Convention in 
automatically ascribing the seabed out to 200 miles to the coastal State, where 
the continental margin does not extend out to that distance, and where the 
coastal State has not claimed seabed rights out to 200 miles. However, the 
Handbook, if it departs at all from customary law, concedes rights which the 
U.S. might otherwise have reserved and is therefore unlikely to generate 
international friction. 
The final, minor, point on the definitions set out in chapter 1 of the Handbook 
concerns the assertion that in the absence of treaty constraints there is a 
freedom to use "international airspace (that over contiguous zones, exclusive 
economic zones, the high seas, and territory not subject to the sovereignty 
of any nation). "25 It may be noted that this view has been challenged by some 
States. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay are reported to have suggested that 
coastal States have the right to regulate by national legislation all aeronautical 
activities in their EEZ'S.26 However, the drafting history of the 1982 
Convention clearly supports the United States' view, and this is supported 
by a recent report to the International Civil Aviation Organization which 
concludes that there is no basis for the assertion that the 1982 Convention 
gives coastal States jurisdiction over overflight in the EEZ.27 While this 
conclusion is certainly right, the attitude of Brazil and others, mirroring 
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similar arguments concerning military uses of the EEZ, outlined above, should 
be seen as signalling that free overflight of the EEZ might not always and 
in all circumstances be regarded in practice as unquestionable by all states 
despite the true position in law.28 
2. International Status and Navigation of Warships and Military Aircraft. The 
second chapter of the Handbook raises more acute issues oflaw touching upon 
naval operations. The definition of warships and military aircraft and the 
account of their immunities follows the terms of the 1958 and 1982 conventions 
on the Law of the Sea and is in general uncontroversial, although it should 
be noted that naval auxiliaries, while enjoying the same immunities as 
warships, are not within the definition of warships given in the Handbook or 
the conventions.29 One aspect of the definition is, however, controversial. The 
Handbook adopts the view taken by the major maritime States that "[ n ]uclear 
powered warships and conventionally powered warships enjoy identical 
international legal status."3O That view is contested by some States. For 
instance, Djibouti is reported to require no advance notification or permission 
for the passage of warships through its territorial sea, but does require advance 
notification for the passage of nuclear-powered ships, and Egypt requires 
prior permission for the passage of nuclear-powered, but only prior notice 
of the passage of conventional, warships.31 Furthermore, States are of course 
entitled in exercising discretions allowed to them by international law to draw 
a distinction between those warships which are powered by or carry nuclear 
materials and those which do not. Perhaps the clearest example of such a 
discretion concerns the admission of warships to ports and internal waters. 
As the Handbook notes, in the absence of some treaty arrangement to the 
contrary, warships and auxiliaries have no right of entry to the ports or 
internal waters of a foreign state.32 The Treaty of Raratonga, which 
implemented an agreed move by certain Pacific States towards the 
establishment of a nuclear-free zone in a large area of the southern Pacific 
around and to the east of Australia, provides in article 5.2 (headed "Prevention 
of stationing of nuclear devices") that: 
Each party in the exercise ofits sovereign rights remains free to decide for itself whether 
to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace 
by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic 
waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane 
passage or transit passage of straits.33 
As discussions in recent years between the governments of New Zealand and 
the United States have shown, there is considerable pot~ntial for lawful 
discrimination by coastal States against warships carrying nuclear materials, 
at least in relation to the entry by such ships into ports and other internal 
waters.34 While special provision may be made to regulate their passage,35 
discrimination against ships carrying nuclear materials amounting to a denial 
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of passage through straits and archipelagic sea lanes does not appear to be 
lawful, nor does such discrimination in relation to rights of innocent passage 
simpliciter, although the scope of the right of innocent passage through the 
territorial sea has been clouded by the drafting of the 1982 Convention. 
Article 19 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which defines innocent 
passage, is one of the most problematic provisions of that Convention from 
the point of view of naval operations, although most of the problems operate 
at the level of legalistic arguments against the robust good sense of the 
Handbook. Article 19 opens, in its first paragraph, with the definition used 
in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention: "Passage is innocent so long as it is 
not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such 
passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with other 
rules of intemationallaw."36 The second paragraph then states that: 
Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order 
or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following 
activities: 
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles 
of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security 
of the coastal State; 
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; 
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device; 
U) the carrying out of research or survey activities; 
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing on 
passage. 
The problems of interpretation are manifold. The question whether the 
list of activities incompatible with innocence in article 19(2) is illustrative 
or exhaustive is clearly answered in the Handbook, which is surely correct 
in regarding the list as merely illustrative.37 No answer is given to the further 
question, whether the ejusdem generis principle applies to the construction of 
article 19, requiring that there be some activity on a par with those listed in 
article 19(2) before innocence be lost. If that construction is correct, it would 
follow that the mere fact of the presence of a passing warship, not engaged 
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in any "activity" of the sort listed in article 19(2), could not be the basis for 
a finding that its passage is non-innocent. Similarly, a law stating that the 
mere carriage on a merchant ship through the territorial sea of "cargo or 
any appliance or apparatus the use of which or persons who may constitute 
a threat against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence 
of the Republic, shall be deemed to be not innocent . . . " could not be 
lawfu1.38 Under the 1958 definition, which now constitutes article 19(1) of 
the 1982 Convention, a coastal State could argue persuasively in some 
circumstances that the very presence of a warship or carriage of such cargo 
prejudiced its peace, good order or security. For instance, the mere passage 
of a superpower naval squadron close to the shore during hours of darkness 
at a time of substantial civil unrest or insurrection might well be perceived 
by a government having a precarious hold on power, but nonetheless 
recognized internationally as competent to act on behalf of the State, as 
prejudicing the peace and good order of the State; the government might 
accordingly determine that such passage is non-innocent.39 That government 
might, furthermore, take the plausible view that the right of a coastal State 
to take "the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which 
is not innocent"40 means that it is entitled to use the lowest effective level 
of force available to it at the time to prevent passage, and it is conceivable 
that there might be nothing available between the extremes of a radio message 
and a Silkworm missile. If such a situation were to arise, and the commander 
of the naval force were to rely on a different interpretation of article 19, 
requiring that his warships engage in some "activity" additional to mere 
passage before they lose their innocence, this doctrinal dispute could quickly 
develop into an international incident. 
That does not exhaust the difficulties of interpreting article 19. Among 
the other difficulties which have been noted by commentators are the 
problems of article 19(2)(a): would the passage of a naval force threatening 
the use offorce against a third State be a "threat ... offorce ... in violation 
of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations," and would the passage of a naval force intended to assist a 
government put down an insurrection which is regarded in the United Nations 
as an attempt by the people of the country concerned to wrest the right of 
self-determination from an unwilling government fall within that provision, 
in either case resulting in the loss of innocence and possible political pressure 
on coastal States to attempt to prevent the passage? At what point, for 
instance, do monitoring coastal installations and broadcasts, soundings on the 
seabed or the testing of the salinity or temperature of the water amount to 
the collection of information to the prejudice of the defense or security of 
the coastal State, or to research or survey activities, proscribed by paragraphs 
(c) and U)? Is the towing of a military device such as a towed sonar array, 
put overboard before entry into the territorial sea and taken aboard after 
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leaving the territorial sea, caught by paragraph {f)? And what "activities" 
are comprehended by paragraph (I)?: the movement of missiles onto launchers, 
or shadowing foreign submarines, or monitoring the seabed for military 
devices which might be emplaced there? Do proscribed activities 
automatically deprive passage of its innocence, even if there is no actual 
prejudice to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State? 
Here, as elsewhere in this paper, the response may be given that there was 
a clear understanding at UNCLOS III as to the interpretation which is to 
be given to the terms of the 1982 Convention. This is a perfectly adequate 
justification for the approach taken in the Handbook, which was not drafted 
as a watertight legal document but as an operational guide. But this is not 
an entirely adequate response to the problem of coping in practice with the 
complex underlying legal questions which might be raised by States 
determined to hold to interpretations of the law diverging from those held 
by the United States. 
Many of the provisions of the 1982 Convention, among them article 19, 
are finding their way into nationallegislation.41 There is a real possibility 
that the interpretation of such national laws by national agencies, inevitably 
colored by the canons of interpretation applied in the relevant legal systems, 
may diverge from the interpretation of the 1982 Convention. Moreover, 
political considerations may induce States to interpret the words of the 
Convention itself in a manner different from that contemplated during the 
conference which spawned it-and if the world has learned anything from 
the" U.S. legal system and its most skillful practitioners, it has surely learned 
that an agreemep.t may be used ruthlessly against parties who neglect to ensure 
that the agreement actually says what they wanted it to say, and says no more. 
Most important, the underlying argument throughout this contribution to the 
debate is that States do differ in their interpretations of the law, and 
consequently the law is not always so clear and precise as to produce certainty, 
either concerning the rights and duties of the United States Navy or the likely 
attitudes and reactions of other States to the use of their waters by United 
States forces. This lack of certainty demands a certain circumspection in the 
exercise of the more controversial rights. It was, after all, the vigorous 
assertion by Libya of a claim to historic waters in the Gulf of Sirte, which 
most States would have regarded as wholly without legal merit, which 
produced fatal armed clashes with United States forces. 
There are two further points concerning innocent passage to be made. The 
first concerns the statement in the Handbook that innocent passage may be 
temporarily suspended in specified areas of the territorial sea when this is 
essential for the protection of the security of the coastal State.42 That 
statement is consistent with the provisions of the conventions,43 and with the 
position taken by the United States in protesting against attempts by Libya 
to close certain areas of its territorial sea permanently.44 It sits less happily 
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with State practice, which contains several examples of laws which have 
purported permanently to forbid navigation in specified areas adjacent to 
military dockyards and installations.45 In practice, such claims do not appear 
to have given rise to international incidents; pragmatism and prudence may 
have prevailed over principle. 
It may seem strange to leave until last the fundamental question, whether 
warships enjoy the right of innocent passage at all. The well-known 
controversy over this question has been debated at length over the years since 
Elihu Root, sometime Secretary of State of the United States, addressed to 
the arbitral tribunal in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case his much-quoted 
(and subsequently, no doubt, much regretted) remark concerning the 
territorial sea: "Warships may not pass without consent into this zone, because 
they threaten. Merchant ships may pass and repass because they do not 
threaten. "46 In essence, his argument was that because warships are inherently 
threatening to the coastal State they are inherently non-innocent and outside 
the scope of the right of innocent passage. Many States adopt. a similar 
position. Nine or so require prior notification as a condition of passage, and 
a further twenty-eight or so require prior authorization, the States concerned 
being drawn from all the major power blocs and regions.47 This position is 
not, however, the one taken by major maritime States such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom, both of which assert a right of innocent 
passage for warships without prior notification or authorization. Nonetheless, 
few international incidents have occurred, largely because of the practice of 
giving low-level and informal notice of passage on the occasions when naval 
vessels are sent into the territorial seas of States requiring notification or 
authorization, which may be followed by a purported "authorization" not 
sought by the passing ships: such ambiguous procedures save honor on both 
sides.48 Important as the controversy is as an academic matter, in practice 
the world has lived more or less happily with the contradictory interpretations 
of the law now for many years, and the assertion of the right of innocent 
passage for warships in the Handboo/e49 is unlikely to upset this modus vivendi. 
One of the most critical elements in the package deal worked out at 
UNCLOS III was the safeguarding of rights of passage through strategic 
straits and archipelagic sea lanes in return for the acceptance of extended 
coastal State territorial seas and jurisdiction over the economic resources of 
the seas off their coasts. The parts of the Handbook dealing with rights to transit 
such waters are therefore of particular importance. 
The 1982 Convention itself establishes a right of transit passage through 
international straits and a substantially identical right of archipelagic sea lanes 
passage through archipelagic sea lanes, which are much broader than the rights 
of innocent passage enjoyed in the territorial sea.50 Transit passage and 
archipelagic sea lanes passage do not depend upon a showing of "innocence;" 
they include a right of overflight, which does not exist over the territorial 
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sea; they appear to allow submerged passage by submarines, which is 
forbidden in the case of innocent passage; and they impose strict limitations 
upon the regulatory competence of the coastal State over ships exercising 
the rights of passage. Here the status of the 1982 Convention is of critical 
importance. Iran, for example, has stated that the right of transit passage is 
"contractual," existing only for parties to the 1982 Convention, and 
presumably only once the Convention enters into force.51 
There is little support evident for the Iranian position, and much that can 
be said against it. It is not the view taken in the Handbook or by the major 
maritime States. Thus, when the United Kingdom extended its territorial sea 
to twelve miles in 1987, it announced, albeit without using the term "transit 
passage," that rights equivalent to those established under the conventional 
transit passage regime would be accorded to ships sailing through the Straits 
of Dover and certain other straits around the United Kingdom.52 Moreover, 
it is arguable that rights wider than the right of innocent passage existed 
through international straits under customary international law even before 
the adoption of the 1982 Convention. In support of this view it has been said 
that transit through and overflight of certain key straits such as Gibraltar 
has long been conducted in a manner which, like transit passage itself, is more 
akin to high seas freedom of navigation than to innocent passage. Furthermore, 
it might be said, this earlier practice offers an explanation for the rapid 
acceptance of the transit passage provisions into the Law of the Sea 
Convention and, perhaps more significantly, for the inclusion in the 1979 
Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel of a right of "unimpeded and non-
suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight" for all States through the 
Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba.53 
Against this view it must be said that the evidence on passage through straits 
is by no means always clear. For instance, in the case of the Straits of Gibraltar, 
until the 1980s the United States recognized only a three mile territorial sea 
and accordingly acted on the basis that there was a high seas corridor through 
the strait-an assumption which, if correct, would render the exercise of 
freedoms of navigation and overflight through the strait uncontroversial, and 
preclude the counting of that practice towards the establishment of a right 
to exercise such freedoms through straits constituted entirely by the territorial 
seas of the littoral States. It should also be noted that several littoral States 
have stated that they do not recognize the right of transit passage in customary 
international law. The 1971 Declaration made by Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore is but one among many examples.54 
Moreover, there are certain technical problems with the view favoring the 
wider right. It is difficult to see how States such as the United States and 
United Kingdom, parties to the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention which, in 
article 16(4), gives merely a non-suspendable right of innocent passage 
through international straits, can claim wider rights as against other parties, 
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such as Malaysia and Spain, which border international straits. This problem 
is exacerbated by the fact that the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention contains 
no provision for its termination or denunciation, and the United Kingdom 
has recorded the view (in relation to a purported denunciation by Senegal 
of, among others, the Territorial Sea Convention) that denunciation is not 
possible.55 There is, therefore, some difficulty in explaining how the parties 
to the Territorial Sea Convention can escape the restrictive rights of passage 
through straits which that Convention sets out. 
It might be argued that only where a treaty intends to exclude wider 
customary law rights can the latter be curtailed by a restrictive treaty 
provision, and that this is not the case in relation to the law on passage through 
straits. But the difficulty of adducing unequivocal evidence to sustain claims 
to a customary law right analogous to transit passage or freedom of navigation 
through international straits which pre-dates the transit passage provisions 
of the 1982 Convention must cast serious doubts upon the legal validity of 
such claims. The better course is to argue that the transit passage provisions 
have passed into customary law since their elaboration at UNCLOS III so 
as to modify the pre-existent treaty rights under the 1958 Convention, and 
to seek to establish that position on the basis of State practice, including the 
assertion of such rights by the United States Navy, among others. 
The most plausible explanation of this process might lie in the doctrine 
of desuetude, or disuse. It is said that for desuetude to operate, four 
requirements must be satisfied: 1) frequently repeated violations of the treaty, 
2) which are imputable to a government and not merely to individuals, and 
3) which have no reasonable explanation (other than as a violation of the 
treaty), and 4) which have not been negated by the protests of the injured 
party.56 It is not clear, however, that the body of action and acquiescence 
is yet sufficiently persuasive to justify the conclusion that the provisions of 
the 1958 Convention have been swept away. It may be unwise to seek to force 
modifications of treaty rights which States appear willing to accept within 
any doctrinal straitjacket. The United Kingdom at 'one stage rejected the 
validity of archipelagic baselines claimed by Indonesia, another party to the 
Territorial Sea Convention, but it would now accept the validity of such 
baselines drawn in conformity with the provisions of the 1982 Convention. 
This position should perhaps best be seen as illustrating either the proposition 
that treaty obligations can be modified, with the agreement of the parties, 
by subsequent changes in customary law, or the proposition that States can 
choose to waive violations of their treaty rights. Whether this should be 
described as an application of the doctrine of desuetude, or as a consensual 
modification of treaty rights, or as some other form of development in the 
law, is less important than the fact of the change. If rights of transit passage 
are asserted often enough, and are not seriously challenged, such rights will 
become established in law. 
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If the claim is accepted that customary law includes a right similar to the 
conventional right of transit passage, further problems concerning transit 
passage remain. The Handbook states that the right of transit passage obtains 
in "straits used for international navigation through the territorial sea 
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another 
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. "57 There is nothing wrong 
with that statement, which follows the wording of article 37 of the 1982 
Convention. The problem lies in determining what it means in practice, and 
the Handbook offers no guidance. Differences have arisen between the United 
States and other States over whether a particular strait falls within the 
category of "straits used for international navigation." For example, the 
United States has argued that the Northwest Passage through the Canadian 
archipelago is an international strait, but Canada has contested this, arguing 
that the waters in question are historic internal waters through which passage 
is subject to Canadian control and regulation. It might also be argued that 
the volume of traffic through the strait is so small as to disqualify it from 
the category of straits used for international navigation.58 In such cases the 
account of transit passage given in the Handbook is of limited value: the critical 
factor is the political decision on the vigor with which the United States 
wishes to press its view and assert the rights which it claims in relation to 
such disputed straits. 
Despite the admirable clarity of the definition of transit passage in the 1982 
Convention, there are difficulties in determining its precise scope, highlighted 
by the manner in which the relevant rules are presented in the Handbook. The 
assertion that submarines may transit submerged59 is commonly accepted, 
although this right is not spelled out in the 1982 Convention. It is an inference, 
albeit a reasonable one, from article 39(1)(c) of the 1982 Convention, which 
requires passing vessels to refrain from activities other than those incident 
to their "normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit" which, it is 
said, can only mean that submarines may transit submerged. More 
troublesome is the statement that warships may engage in "formation 
steaming and the launching and recovery of aircraft."6O Formation steaming 
might be acceptable as a normal precaution for the security of the vessels 
concerned, but the 1982 Convention is silent on the question of launching 
and recovering aircraft. The right of overflight alone does not seem sufficient 
warrant for such activities, which are markedly different in nature from 
overflight between points lying outside the territorial sea of the littoral States, 
and the justification must be found in the nature of the right of transit passage 
itself. Whatever understandings may have been reached at UNCLOS III, these 
aircraft rights are not included in the Convention's actual provisions, and their 
validity will tum largely upon their unopposed exercise in practice, 
constituting an "agreed interpretation" of the Convention for the parties and 
a rule of customary law for non-parties. 
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It should also be noted that there is some doubt as to whether it is true 
in all circumstances that transit passage may not be suspended for ships 
engaged in armed conflict with a third State.61 It is certainly true that the 
right of transit passage does not depend upon any criterion of innocence. 
However, it is stated, in article 38(3) of the 1982 Convention, that "[a ]ny 
activity which is not an exercise of the right of transit passage through a 
strait remains subject to the other applicable provisions of this Convention." 
This raises the question, what "activities" put a vessel outside the scope of 
transit passage? At one extreme, it might be argued that any activity other 
than continuous and expeditious transit of the strait would have this effect. 
On the other hand, the duty of vessels engaged in transit to refrain from the 
threat or use of force against the littoral States is not included as an element 
of the definition of the right of transit passage in article 38, but as an ancillary 
duty in article 39 of the 1982 Convention, thus suggesting that there are 
activities other than mere transit which, though unlawful, do not deprive the 
passage of its transit character. Here again, the correct interpretation of the 
law will have to be constituted by State practice. 
Undoubtedly, the major naval powers will choose to see transit passage 
as a right close to the high seas freedom of navigation, and will tend to argue 
that whatever a vessel in transit through the strait might do while it is in 
transit the right of passage cannot be denied, and any complaint of unlawful 
behavior must be pursued through the normal channels for settling 
international disputes. Of course, a vessel not engaged in transit but, say, 
deliberately stationed at anchor in the strait (the anchoring not being 
incidental to its passage) would fall outside the right of transit passage; and 
because it would by definition be in the territorial sea it would fall under 
the rules applicable to that zone, including the rules allowing the coastal State 
to use reasonable force to prevent non-innocent passage. 
The foregoing remarks on transit passage apply equally to the provisions 
in the Handbook concerning the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage.62 A 
further problem arises from the position taken by the Philippines, which stated 
on signature of the 1982 Convention that 
The provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes do not nullify 
or impair the sovereignty of the Philippines as an archipelagic State over the sea lanes 
and do not deprive it of authority to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty, 
independence, and security. 
The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters under 
the Constitution of the Philippines, and removes straits connecting these waters with 
the economic zone or high sea from the rights of foreign vessels to transit passage for 
international navigation.63 
One of the main aims of the provisions on archipelagic sea lanes passage was, 
of course, to "impair" the sovereignty of the littoral State, in the sense of 
limiting the right of the State to impose its laws on or restrict the movements 
of passing ships, and to give such ships transit rights through the major 
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established international seaways crossing the archipelago substantially 
identical to transit passage rights; and there is no doubt that this is precisely 
what the 1982 Convention does. The Philippine position appears absurd, but 
it is not entirely devoid of a certain superficial plausibility. It is true that 
the 1982 Convention does not detract from the rights of any State to act in 
self-defense under the provisions of article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 
and there is no obvious reason why an archipelagic State party to the 1982 
Convention should not enact legislation to that effect, so long as it does not 
attempt .to regulate passage through the sea lanes in a manner inconsistent 
with the 1982 Convention provisions. That said, it is difficult to believe that 
the Philippine statement was seeking merely to establish this banal 
proposition. It is also true that in the section of the 1982 Convention dealing 
with straits, the transit passage provisions do not extend to straits connecting 
the high seas or EEZ with the territorial or internal waters of a State. 
Furthermore, the transit passage regime, stricto sensu, does not apply to passages 
through archipelagic waters, although the provisions on archipelagic sea lanes 
_ passage, which are very similar to the transit passage provisions, do so apply. 
But again, it is hard to believe that these rather inconsequential points 
motivated the Philippine statement. It is scarcely surprising that several 
governments have registered forceful objections to the Philippine statement, 
characterizing it as an attempt to evade the obligation to accord rights of 
archipelagic sea lanes passage to foreign ships and aircraft.64 If nothing else, 
the declaration offers a fine illustration of the danger of States adopting 
tortured interpretations of the 1982 Convention whenever it might suit them 
to do so. 
Apart from the question of Flight Information Regions and Air Defense 
Identification Zones, which fall outside the scope of this paper but which 
have led to serious controversy in the past,65 there are three further matters 
in the second chapter of the Handbook which call for comment and which 
are not dealt with elsewhere in this paper: they are the establishment of closed 
areas of the high seas, and certain particular problems -arising in the Arctic 
and Antarctic. The high seas point can be dealt with swiftly. The Handbook 
states that 
Any nation may declare a temporary closure or warning area on the high seas to advise 
other nations of the conduct of activities that, although lawful, are hazardous to 
navigation and/or overflight .... Ships and aircraft of other nations are not required 
to remain outside a declared closure or warning area, but are obliged to refrain from 
interfering with activities therein.66 
Although it has sometimes been asserted that there is a right to close off areas 
of the high seas temporarily, using force to prevent the entry of foreign ships, 
the statement in the Handbook, based on the freedom to use the high seas with 
due regard for the interests of other high seas users, seems to this writer to 
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be as accurate as it is succinct, and to be an admirably clear expression of 
the prevailing law. 
The passages concerning the Arctic and Antarctic will also appear 
unobjectionable to most readers. However, the view that there is a high seas 
freedom of navigation and overflight on, over, and under the waters and 
icepack of the Arctic would not pass undisputed by all States.67 As was 
mentioned above, Canada, for instance, has claimed certain waters in the 
Canadian Arctic archipelago as historic internal waters-a claim which, if 
valid, would necessarily oust the high seas freedoms in the areas concerned. 
Similarly, the United States position concerning Antarctica is premised upon 
its refusal to recognize any of the territorial claims on that continent: such 
claims have been made by Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, 
Norway, and the United Kingdom. In practice, however, international 
cooperation over the management of Antarctica has been and continues to 
be remarkably successful, and there is little danger of any serious international 
difficulties arising from the non-recognition of the various claims. 
3. Protection of Persons and Property at Sea. From this point onwards in the 
Handbook, matters become much less clear. In most cases, where "pure" law-
of-the-sea questions become enmeshed with questions concerning the legality 
of the use of force to protect persons, property or rights, one is faced with 
an array of possible justifications, one shading off into another so 
imperceptibly that it is often of little practical value to seek to determine 
the limitations of any particular justification. This is particularly true of the 
right of self-defense. It must be said at this point that the present paper does 
not attempt an exhaustive analysis of this unsettled area of the law. Such a 
task demands a paper in itself. With that proviso, an attempt is made in the 
following paragraphs to identify the main areas of controversy. 
The first such area arises in the context of piracy. The Handbook gives a 
plain account of the rules on the repression of piracy, adhering for the most 
part to the wording of the relevant provisions of the 1958 High Seas 
Convention and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.68 Thus, piracy is 
confined to cases of illegal acts of violence, detention or depredation 
committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or 
aircraft in or over international waters against another ship or aircraft or 
persons and property on board. Specifically excluded from this definition are 
cases of mutiny and passenger hijacking, which do not constitute piracy 
because they do not involve acts committed by one ship or aircraft against 
another.69 The definition is a matter of international law. Individual States 
may choose to enact municipal legislation describing hijackings as "piracy," 
but such acts would not constitute piracy as a matter of international law 
and so would not be subject to the exceptional jurisdictional rules allowing 
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any State to seize pirate ships on the high seas.7° This point is considered 
further below. 
This scrupulous adherence to the terms of international conventions breaks 
down in the provisions concerning the pursuit of pirates. The Handbook states 
categorically that 
Pursuit of a pirate vessel or aircraft through or over international straits overlapped 
by territorial waters or through or over archipelagic sea lanes may proceed with or 
without the consent of the coastal nation or nations, provided the pursuit is expeditious 
and direct and the transit passage rights of others are not unreasonably constrained in 
the process.71 
This view is probably based on the understanding that the purpose of transit 
or archipelagic sea lanes passage is irrelevant to its legality, and that only 
the manner of such passage is so relevant. That interpretation may draw support 
from the ruling of the International Court of Justice to similar effect in the 
context of innocent passage in the Corfu Channel case.72 Nonetheless, it does 
not necessarily overcome the objection that pursuit may constitute an 
"activity" additional to mere passage which would, under articles 39(1)(c) 
and 54 of the 1982 Convention, take the pursuing ship outside the scope of 
transit or archipelagic sea lanes passage. The United States view is, 
presumably, that pursuit is not another "activity" and that it does not result 
in the loss of transit rights. But if that be so, it is not immediately apparent 
why the same claim to a right to pursue through straits and archipelagic sea 
lanes is not made in the context of hot pursuit. The part of the Handbook dealing 
with that topic, however, states that the right of pursuit ceases as soon as 
the ship pursued enters its own or a third State's territorial sea.73 While it 
may be thought that no State could wish to object to the pursuit of pirates, 
as the common enemies of mankind, some coastal States may yet be jealous 
of their sovereignty. If that point is unsettled, it is perfectly plain that the 
pirate vessels may not be seized in or over territorial or archipelagic waters. 
Such seizure would, if committed without the consent of the coastal State 
concerned, undoubtedly violate that State's sovereignty, and it is unfortunate 
that the Handbook does not make this clear. 
As was noted above, the definition of piracy excludes mutinies and 
passenger hijackings. However, as the Handbook notes in a later section, 
International law , embodied in the doctrines of self-defense and protection of nationals, 
provides authority for the use of proportionate force by u.s. warships and military 
aircraft when necessary for the protection of U.S. flag vessels, u.s. citizens (whether 
embarked in U.S. or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence in 
international waters.74 
That claim, evident in the United States' action in the Achille Lauro affair,75 
puts in issue the current ambit of the right of self-defense and allied rights. 
Although the right to use force in peacetime to protect national flag vessels 
might be well established, the use of force to protect nationals on foreign 
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flag ships is much more controversial.76 The Handbook notes the primary 
responsibility of the coastal State in internal, archipelagic and territorial 
waters for the protection of all persons and vessels lawfully within its 
territory, and cautions against interference with the exercise of jurisdiction 
by such coastal States.77 But even in relation to action on the high seas or 
in the EEZ, it is at the very least arguable that forcible action to protect 
U.S. citizens on foreign flag ships cannot lawfully be taken unless the flag 
State concerned has requested or consented to such use of force, or is in 
violation ofits duty to take all reasonable steps to secure the safety and release 
of the victims, or immediate action is required to protect human life. Indeed, 
those criteria are quite properly set out in the Handbook as governing the use 
of force to protect foreign flag vessels and foreign persons.78 
The Handbook is, understandably, somewhat reticent on the detailed rules 
concerning the use of force to protect U.S. interests. It refers to the peacetime 
rules of engagement, which are "carefully constructed to ensure that the 
protection of U.S. flag vessels and U.S. citizens and their property at sea 
conforms with U.S. and international law and reflects national policy. ''79 It 
may be that those rules of engagement impose strict limitations on the 
circumstances in which such protection is to be forcibly asserted. Without 
sight of them, there is little more that can be said by way of a critique of 
the position adopted in the Handbook. 
4. Safeguarding of u.s. National Interests in the Maritime Environment. The 
fourth and final chapter in the part of the Law of Peacetime Naval Operations 
sets out the obligations under the United Nations Charter to use peaceful 
means to settle international disputes and to refrain from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of States 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, 
with the exception of the right to use force in self-defense preserved by article 
51 of the Charter. It also emphasizes the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality which attend the use of force in self-defense. 
The scope of the right of self-defense is, of course, one of the most debated 
issues in contemporary international law, and the comments offered here do 
not approach an exhaustive nor even comprehensive survey of the subject. 
As the debate continues, the tendency is for official formulations of the 
doctrine to retreat into the Delphic wisdom of the Caroline formula, and the 
Handbook is no exception to this tendency. Self-defense is dealt with in three 
paragraphs.80 The first sets out the right in general terms, and cites a number 
of examples of protective action "premised on the broader principle of self-
defense," among them the Cuban quarantine of 1962; the second lays claim 
to a right of anticipatory self defence; and the third, in effect, says that all 
the important rules are to be found outside the Handbook, in the peacetime 
Rules of Engagement. 
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The first of these paragraphs raises the question of the kinds of action 
justified under the doctrine of self-defense. The Cuban quarantine focused 
attention on the difficulties of using self-defense against threats which are 
neither threats of the use of armed force, nor threats of immediate and 
unlawful injuries to a State. Indeed, as Abram Chayes recalls in his excellent 
study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, even within the United States 
administration there were considerable misgivings concerning the 
applicability of the doctrine in that context, and attempts were. made to rest 
the justification of the action on the supposed "authorization" of the action 
by the Organization of American States.81 These difficulties have been 
increased by the decision of the International Court in the Nicaragua case, in 
which the majority (in passages open to serious criticism) appeared to hold 
that the right of self-defense exists only in the face of an armed attack, and 
not acts which do not amount to an armed attack.82 It is inconceivable that 
the Court which delivered the Nicaragua judgment should have held the Cuban 
quarantine to be a lawful exercise of the right of self-defense. The Handbook's 
assertion that the quarantine "has been widely approved as a legitimate 
exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense" may 
be true.83 It is also true, but not stated, that the quarantine has been widely 
criticized as failing to meet the requirements for the invocation of that 
doctrine, and that such criticisms have received powerful support from the 
Nicaragua judgment.84 
It requires but little prescience to see that, post-Nicaragua, States are likely 
to place greater reliance on the right of anticipatory self-defense, consideration 
of which was expressly excluded from the International Court's judgment 
in that case.85 Although reputable commentators have questioned the 
existence of a right of anticipatory self-defense, their views are bewildering. 
One wonders what, exactly, they think defense is. Certainly, the idea that 
an attack must be suffered before a right of defense arises makes no sense. 
It is not the preceding attack that justifies the use of force, for that would 
be an essentially punitive response. The justification lies in the use of force 
to ward off a continuation of the attack, or further attacks. In that sense, 
the existence of an actual attack can have only an evidential role, putting 
beyond doubt the hostile intent of the aggressor. But if that intent can be 
otherwise established (as it must be if anticipatory action is to be lawful, since 
the right is one of anticipatory self-defense, not preemptive attack), there 
seems no earthly reason why the right of self-defense cannot be invoked. 
Regrettably, but for obvious reasons, the Handbook does not detail the 
circumstances in which hostile intent will be presumed by the United States 
Navy. Such matters are dealt with in the Rules of Engagement. There is little 
point in speculating on what those rules might be. However, it may be helpful 
to offer three general comments. 
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First, the Handbook follows the Caroline formula and requires that there be 
a "clear necessity that is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no reasonable 
choice of means."86 The word "reasonable" is important. It is difficult to 
believe that Professor O'Connell was right in suggesting that "in the exercise 
of sea power one must expect to sustain an initial casualty before going into 
action under the cover of self-defense. "87 Such an attitude towards the 
determination of hostile intent cannot in all circumstances be realistic. If, for 
instance, the "initial casualty" suffered by the United Kingdom in the 
Falklands conflict had been one of its aircraft carriers, it is quite possible that 
the British action would have had to be aborted. If losing an initial casualty 
means losing the conflict, the right of self-defense can only mean that there 
is a right to use force to avert the initial casualty. 
Second, the difficulty of establishing proportionality in the context of self-
defense should be noted. To return to the Falklands example, the threat 
presented by the General Belgrano itself to the British fleet was limited; the 
threat presented by the entire Argentinian Navy was considerable. If sinking 
the General Belgrano was arguably a disproportionate response to the threat 
which it alone presented, could it not be argued also that the sinking was 
an economical and proportionate use of force to avert the threat presented 
by the entire Argentinian Navy (which did not, indeed, further threaten the 
British task force after the sinking)? Proportionality would be a beautifully 
clear test, if only it were clear what has to be counted in establishing the 
proportions. 
A third, and related, point is that the right of anticipatory self-defense may 
exist in circumstances which appear close to reprisals. For example, the attack 
by the United States on an Iranian oil platform on October 19, 1987, three 
days after the United States merchant ship Sea Isle City had been hit by an 
Iranian missile, appears at first sight to be an act of reprisal, since the attack 
on the Sea Isle City (and other vessels around the same time) was over and 
done with. But here, as in other circumstances where there is a "pinprick" 
pattern of repeated attacks, each relatively limited in scope, it is surely 
legitimate to take action in order to avert future attacks of the same kind 
if (and only if) satisfactory evidence of the likelihood of future attacks can 
be adduced.88 
The situation in the Gulf underlines the swiftness with which States can 
move from a situation of dealing with isolated violations of their rights to 
outright armed conflict. One of the most important passages in this chapter 
of the Handbook is the observation that, "[i]n recent years ... the concepts 
of both 'war' and 'peace' have become blurred and no longer lend themselves 
to clear definition. Consequently, it is not always possible, or even useful, 
to try to draw neat distinctions between the two. "89 That observation is 
critical to an understanding of the significance of the second part of the 
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Handbook, which deals with the Law of Naval Warfare, and to that part 
attention will now be turned. 
The Law of Naval Warfare 
5. Principles and Sources of the Law of Armed Conflict. Nothing which is said 
subsequently must be allowed to detract from one crucial point which goes 
to the very heart of the defensibility of all of this part of the Handbook. Put 
simply, it is by no means clear that the traditional Laws of War retain their 
validity today. This point arises clearly in chapter five, which details the 
principles and sources of the "Law of Armed Conflict." The statement of 
principles, based on the use of minimum force and the distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants, is unremarkable. The statement of the 
sources from which those principles are distilled raises one of the most 
important controversies in contemporary international law. 
The customary Law of War is treated with appropriate caution: 
It is frequently difficult to determine the precise point in time at which a usage or practice 
of warfare evolves into a customary rule of law. In a period marked by rapid 
developments in technology, coupled with the broadening of the spectrum of warfare 
to encompass insurgencies and state-sponsored terrorism, it is not surprising that nations 
often disagree as to the precise content of an accepted practice of warfare and as to 
its status as a rule of law. This lack of precision in the definition and interpretation 
of rules of customary law has been a principal motivation behind efforts to codify the 
law of armed conflict through written agreements (treaties and conventions).90 
It is the reference in the last sentence to treaties and conventions which gives 
rise to difficulty. The· Handbook proceeds to list the principal international 
agreements "reflecting the development and codification of the law of armed 
conflict." The list is headed by certain of the Hague Conventions of 1907,91 
which exemplify the traditional Laws of War. None of those Hague 
Conventions has more than about one-fifth of the States which presently 
constitute the world community as parties, and many of the parties have 
entered reservations to parts of those Conventions; and although there are 
isolated examples of States notifying in recent years the continued 
applicability of some of them,92 there must be considerable doubt as to the 
extent to which the Conventions represent current law. 
These doubts arise from a number of specifically legal considerations (quite 
apart from the doubts created by technical developments in weaponry and 
from widespread failures to comply with some of the supposed rules, such 
as those in the 1936 London Submarine Protocol)93 which are familiar and 
can be briefly stated. First, there is the argument that since the outlawing 
of the use of force by the United Nations Charter, no state of "war" can 
lawfully arise. Accordingly the criterion for the applicability of the Laws 
of War cannot be met, the legality of all uses of force henceforth being judged 
by reference to the terms of the Charter. The Handbook disposes of this 
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argument by stating that "[w]hether or not resort to armed conflict in a 
particular circumstance is prohibited by the United Nations Charter (and 
therefore unlawful), the manner in which that armed conflict is conducted 
continues to be regulated by the law of armed conflict. "94 That proposition 
might command widespread assent, but does not wholly resolve the argument. 
Some of the provisions of the Hague Conventions, and rather more of the 
traditional customary Law of War, cannot easily be reconciled with the 
Charter. For example, article 1 of Hague Convention XI concerning the right 
of capture in naval war assumes the legality of the blockade of ports. On 
the other hand, the United Nations has taken the view that blockade 
constitutes an act of aggression, and that no consideration of whatever nature, 
whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a 
justification for aggression.95 Blockade could only be justified as an act of 
self-defense, but in that case the requirements of necessity and proportionality 
inherent in the doctrine of self-defense create substantial problems for the 
interdiction of third-State shipping by means ofblockade.96 Plainly, the Laws 
of War must be read in the light of the Charter, and the Charter itself requires 
that it prevail in the case of any inconsistency between them.97 Only uses 
of force authorized by the United Nations or kept within the confines of the 
right of self-defense are lawful, and the rights and duties of States under the 
traditional Laws of War must be regarded as having been modified 
accordingly.98 
The second consideration is that the Laws of War, as will be seen, conflict 
in many particulars with the rules set out in the 1958 and 1982 conventions 
on the Law of the Sea.99 This conflict arises even at the most general level. 
Article 88 of the 1982 Convention reserves the high seas (and, by virtue of 
article 58, the EEZ) for peaceful purposes. Article 301 of the Convention 
requires States using the seas to refrain from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations. The combined effect is no more, and certainly 
no less, than to tie the legality of uses of the seas to compliance with the 
constraints on the use of force under the Charter. The natural inference is 
that the use of force, whether or not authorized under the Laws of War, 
could only be lawful under the 1982 Convention to the extent that it is 
justifiable under the Charter-i.e., for practical purposes in this context, 
justifiable according to the rules on self-defense, embodied in article 51 of 
the Charter. 
This in turn raises the question whether the 1982 (or 1958) conventions apply 
in case of armed conflict. While none of the 1958 conventions on the Law 
of the Sea expressly so provide, it is true that the International Law 
Commission, which prepared draft articles on the subject for consideration 
by the Geneva Conference, intended the articles to apply in time of peace.lOO 
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The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention is similarly silent, although here, too, 
it was understood that the Conference was concerned with the peacetime 
Law of the Sea. If the rules on self-defense are regarded as governing all uses 
offorce, no problem arises, since the right of self-defense will (almost) always, 
as a matter oflaw, allow the use of force in violation of treaty obligations.lOl 
But if the Law of War is regarded as still operative, there arises the 
considerable problem of knowing when the peacetime conventional rules are 
overridden by the Law of War. This problem might be answered for practical 
purposes for the u.S. Navy by the invocation of the wartime rules of 
engagement,l02 but this does not dispose of the legal question: might the 
wartime rules of engagement, as a matter of international law , be incorrectly 
invoked? 
That said, it must be admitted that the United States is not alone in referring 
to the old Laws of War as still operative.103 
The significance of these issues can be illustrated with a single example. 
The traditional Law of War allows neutral coastal States to deny belligerents 
passage through the territorial sea. The 1958 and 1982 Conventions give a 
right of innocent passage, and even though that right may be suspended 
temporarily for security reasons, such suspension may not discriminate in fact 
or form between foreign ships.t04 May a coastal State deny passage to 
belligerent ships, but not to non-belligerent foreign ships? If so, at what point 
does the right to override the provisions of the Law of the Sea conventions 
arise, in cases where there is no express declaration of war or recognition 
of belligerency? Does it make any difference if either or both (or all) of the 
belligerents claim to be using force in self-defense, and does it further modify 
the position if the coastal State, or States generally, or the United Nations, 
or the International Court, have recognized that such claims of self-defense 
are legally valid? Would the coastal State's rights to suspend passage be any 
different if it sought to justify its own action under the rules of self-defense-
would that permit a discriminatory denial of passage to the belligerents alone? 
There are no easy answers to such questions, and no answers at all which 
do not depend in large measure upon the position which is adopted concerning 
the relationship of the United Nations Charter, the Laws of War, and the 
peacetime Law of the Sea. 
It is, moreover, apparent that there is no settled international consensus 
upon what that relationship might be. The issue is rarely addressed directly, 
but divergences in States' views may be inferred from their practice. To take 
one further example to contrast with the approach adopted in the Handbook, 
in the recent Iran-Iraq conflict, the United Kingdom clearly tied the question 
of the legality of the practice of the belligerent States in visiting and searching 
neutral flag merchant ships in the Persian/Arabian Gulf to article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter: 
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[U]nder article 51 of the United Nations Charter a state such as Iran, actively engaged 
in an armed conflict, is entitled in exercise of its inherent right of self defence, to stop 
and search a foreign merchant ship on the high seas if there is reasonable ground for 
suspecting that the ship is taking arms to the other side for use in the conflict. This 
is an exceptional right: if the suspicions prove to be unfounded and if the ship has not 
committed acts calculated to give rise to suspicion, then the ship's owners have a good 
claim for compensation for loss caused by the delay.1°s 
The language is permeated by the essence of self-defense: the particular ship 
must be suspicious; the suspicion must be one of carrying arms; and, must 
be one of carrying them to the other side. The right of action is tightly bound 
by the requirements of necessity and the imminence of the threat against 
which the State is defending itself. 
Contrast that statement with the approach adopted in the Handbook: 
Visit and search is the means by which a belligerent warship or belligerent military 
aircraft may determine the true character (enemy or neutral) of merchant ships 
encountered outside neutral territory, the nature (contraband or exempt "free goods") 
of their cargo, the manner (innocent or hostile) of their employment, and other facts 
bearing on their relation to the armed ·conflict.106 
The whole approach is quite different, the Handbook not ruling out the 
systematic, precautionary visit and search of foreign merchant ships. Indeed, 
the two passages illustrate what appears to be a significant difference between 
the approaches of the United States and the United Kingdom. Both in the 
Falklands conflict in 1982 and in its reactions to the recent Gulf conflict, the 
United Kingdom has striven to avoid any recourse to the language of the 
traditional Law of War or any other suggestion that those rules are applicable, 
and has sought to pin all questions of the legality of armed action to the 
doctrine of self-defense under article 51 of the Charter. The Handbook, on 
the other hand, freely uses the vocabulary of the Laws of War and appears 
to admit a considerable role for the traditional law .107 If NATO has not yet 
attempted to resolve such differences, which could crucially affect the 
feasibility of joint NATO action in contexts such as the Gulf conflict, it should 
attach a high priority to doing so. 
The remaining comments upon this second part of the Handbook must be 
understood against that background. The comments are made, for the most 
part, on the assumption that the United States' perception of the role of the 
Laws of War is correct, although that position is not one which commends 
itself to the present author, who prefers the view that those laws must be 
read in light of the constraints on the use of force imposed by the United 
Nations Charter. 
6. Adherence and Enforcement. Chapter six of the Handbook is concerned with 
the responsibility of States and individuals to comply with the Laws of War. 
The most notable provisions concern reprisal, defined as "an enforcement 
measure under the law of armed conflict consisting of an act which would 
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otherwise be unlawful but which is justified as a response to the unlawful 
acts of an enemy. "108 The legal status of reprisals involving the use of force 
is not wholly settled. The United Nations Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by 
the General Assembly in 1970 by consensus, provides that "States have a duty 
to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force. "109 This is difficult 
to reconcile with the traditional right of belligerents to take reprisals. Perhaps 
the most satisfactory justification of armed reprisals is to be gleaned from 
a statement in the Handbook itself: "[t]he sole purpose of a reprisal is to induce 
the enemy to cease its illegal activity and to comply with the law of armed 
conflict. "110 Reprisals are, on this view, emphatically not retaliatory: on the 
contrary, they are essentially defensive, being aimed at the prevention of 
further actions in violation of the Laws of War against the State taking 
reprisals. They may be reconciled with the Charter by regarding them as 
an aspect of the doctrine of self-defense,111 and accordingly they must be 
confined to the action necessary to avert a real and imminent threat, and 
proportionate to the magnitude of the harm threatened. The criteria for valid 
reprisals given in the Handbook are consistent with the traditional rules and 
with the account given here, with one exception.1l2 It is said that the reprisal 
must be proportional to the original violation. That may be quite different 
from the proportion which it would bear to the harm threatened in the future, 
against which the proportionality of defensive action should be measured. 
For example, the shooting down without warning of a civil aircraft known 
to be carrying key enemy politicians might occur in circumstances which 
make it plain that only that aircraft and the politicians on it were regarded 
as a military target. There might be no threat of repetitions of the action, 
and in that case "reprisals" would not be justified under article 51 of the 
Charter. In fact, since the Handbook criteria specify that reprisal action must 
desist as soon as the enemy is induced to desist from its unlawful activities, 
this point is probably covered. Furthermore, the Handbook notes that the 
United States has historically been reluctant to resort to reprisal because of 
the -risk of triggering retaliatory escalation, and that the National Command 
Authorities alone may authorize the taking of reprisal action.ll3 It may 
therefore be expected that the obligation to confine action taken by way of 
reprisal within the limits of proportionality and necessity will be a paramount 
factor in deciding upon the permissibility of any proposed reprisal action. 
7. The Law of Neutrality. The most complex questions concerning the Laws 
of War at sea arise in the context of what used to be called-and is still called 
by the Handbook-the Law of Neutrality. Here there is a direct confrontation 
between the demands or expectations of States not involved in the conflict 
that they be allowed to enjoy their peacetime rights, and on the other hand 
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the demands or expectations of the combatants that they be allowed to engage 
in operations necessary for the protection of their security and their other 
rights under international law. The position is complicated from the outset 
by the fact that, both under the United Nations Charter and under treaties 
of collective self-defense, States may be obliged to intervene in a conflict 
on behalf of one of the combatant States, and to that extent neutrality is not 
an option.114 However, as experience in the recent conflict between Iran and 
Iraq shows clearly, there is still an important role for the institution of 
neutrality. 
Chapter seven of the Handbook sets out an account of the rights and duties 
of neutral States, in what is for the most part a clear and concise restatement 
of the traditional rules. Thus, for instance, the "24-hour rule" in Hague 
Convention XIII, requiring that belligerent vessels be given a day to leave 
neutral ports at the outbreak of armed conflict, and the rule limiting the 
number of warships of any belligerent allowed to be in a neutral port 
simultaneously (absent special legislation by the neutral State) to three, are 
repeated here.115 It was noted above that there are some doubts as to the 
continuing validity of these rules, and as to their applicability in a post-
Charter world. But the remaining comments on this chapter will deal with 
broader issues, in which the conflict between the Law of Neutrality and 
peacetime rights and duties under the Law of the Sea is most apparent. 
The problem of reconciling the traditional neutral right to close territorial 
waters to belligerent warships116 with the duty to suspend innocent passage 
only on a non-discriminatory basis was remarked upon above, in the comments 
on chapter five of the Handbook. Other problems arise in the same context. 
One of the most important of these is the uncertain relationship between acts 
of passing vessels which deprive them of their innocence, and acts which 
violate the neutrality of the coastal State. It is not difficult to imagine 
circumstances where the "mere" passage of a belligerent warship steps onto 
the borderline between mere passage and the use of neutral waters as a 
sanctuary or base of operations, but without prejudicing the peace, good order 
or security of the coastal State. This may be true, for instance, in cases where 
the duration of passage exceeds 24 hours.ll7 What is the coastal State to do? 
It may feel obliged to apply the peacetime rule, relying upon its rights to 
suspend innocent passage, to terminate non-innocent passage and to act in 
self-defense in order to safeguard its rights and interests. On this basis, it may 
feel obliged to permit what it regards as innocent passage. The other 
belligerent may regard a more protracted passage as a violation of coastal 
neutrality, and assert a right to engage in self-help enforcement actions in 
cases where the neutral State cannot or will not enforce its neutrality.11s 
In the absence of an authoritative determination of the point at which the 
peacetime rules yield to the Laws of War and Neutrality, the dangers of 
disputes arising between the "neutral" and "belligerent" States (use of the 
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terms begs the question) is only too apparent.119 If the Laws of War and 
Neutrality are to be invoked, there is no obvious solution to this problem. 
If, on the other hand, the actions of combatant and neutral States are judged 
by reference to the rules of self-defense, the legal significance of the transition 
from peace to war is greatly reduced, and the position somewhat more certain. 
The coastal State's rights remain as stated above; but the belligerents may 
not use self-help in response to every uncorrected breach of neutrality, but 
only in response to those breaches which threaten some immediate injury to 
themselves. 
The assertion of the right to engage in self-help enforcement actions is itself 
controversial.l20 Certainly, the judgment of the International Court in the 
Corfu Channel Case suggests that forcible self-help is unlawful in international 
law.121 There is, indeed, very little evidence, outside the cases of the use of 
force to protect nationals (which are better regarded as instances of the use 
of force in self-defense), of the international community accepting the legality 
of self-help actions. l22 However, the applicability of the view to cases of the 
enforcement of neutral duties might be doubted. Castren, writing in 1954, 
took the same view as that taken in the Handbook. He wrote that "If. . . a 
neutral State has neither the desire nor the power to interfere and the situation 
is serious, other belligerents may resort to self-help. "123 The question only 
becomes relevant where combatants violate the neutrality of another State 
which in tum is unable or unwilling to prevent such violation, and is therefore 
unlikely to arise commonly. But if such extreme cases do arise, it seems 
probable that where military considerations demand it, States will not shrink 
from taking such action in self-help, no matter how dubious its legality. It 
should also be recognized that in some cases justifications for action might 
be made on the broad ground of self-defense. 
Similar difficulties attend the attempts to justify the traditional rules on 
visit and search and blockade. Exercise of visit and search interferes with 
the freedom of navigation on the high seas and innocent passage through the 
territorial sea. At what stage in a conflict, and in what circumstances, do 
the conventional rights of visit (which, under the 1958 and 1982 Conventions, 
do not extend to visit and search for the purpose of interdicting supplies to 
the enemy) give way to the traditional belligerent right of visit and search?124 
As was noted above, the British view appears to be that each individual 
instance of visit and search must be justified as an exercise in self-defense, 
whereas the Handbook appears to contemplate systematic visit and search. 
Pragmatism suggests that the difficulties of determining the nature of cargoes 
carried by merchant ships should tend to support a right of systematic visit 
and search, but it must be admitted that this is difficult to reconcile with 
the normal navigational rights of neutral States under the 1958 and 1982 
Conventions (and, of course, under customary law). 
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Associated with the question of visit and search is the troubled question 
of contraband. It is often observed that because the war effort of a country 
is so inextricably rooted in its general economy, the distinction between 
materials which contribute to the war effort and those which do not simply 
cannot be drawn with anything approaching clarity. There has been a steady 
move in this century towards the extension of the category of contraband. 
To speak of contraband consisting in goods "susceptible to use in armed 
conflict" hardly narrows the field significantly, as those who recall the 
collection of domestic saucepans and park railings for use by the armaments 
industry in World War II will attest. l25 And if the list of goods the export 
of which has been embargoed on security grounds under the United States 
Export Administration Act is anything to go by, the list of contraband goods 
will be a long one.l26 The Handbook specifies medicines, clothing, shelter and 
food, etc., for the civilian population and sick and wounded combatants as 
exempt from capture as contraband, provided there is not serious reason to 
suppose that such goods will be diverted for military purposes or will release 
other goods for military use and give the enemy a definite military 
advantage. l27 This might compromise the notion of contraband in abstract, 
since all such goods can contribute to the war effort. But the humanitarian 
considerations are rightly to the fore in these cases, and these are more likely 
to be secured by clear statements of the goods exempt from capture than 
by attempting to formulate a coherent and comprehensive definition of 
contraband. 
Consideration of contraband leads naturally to a consideration of blockade. 
Here again, the foremost question is whether the legality of blockade must 
be referred to article 51 of the United Nations Charter, or whether there 
is a more general right for combatants to use this tactic. If article 51 is the 
crucial provision then the blockade must be mounted against an imminent 
threat-and under the rules set out in the Nicaragua case, an imminent threat 
of an armed attack. Precautionary blockades of the kind used in the Cuban 
Missile Crisis are not lawful. Reference of the question to the Laws of War 
raises the general issue of the persistence of those rules and of the manner 
in which the expectation of the continued enjoyment of freedom of navigation 
and innocent passage under the 1958 and 1982 Conventions is to be 
accommodated, and the determination of the point, if any, at which those 
conventions are overridden by the Laws of War. That question has taken on 
an added significance in the light of the International Court's ruling in the 
Nicaragua case that the mining of Nicaraguan ports by the United States 
infringed third States' freedom of communication and maritime commerce.t28 
That said, the account of blockade given in the HandbookI29 is, in terms of 
the traditional Laws of War, unexceptionable. There are some debatable 
points, such as the old chestnuts as to whether a blockade can lawfully be 
mounted by mining alone,13o and whether the prohibition in Hague 
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Convention VIII on the use of naval mines "with the sole purpose of 
intercepting commercial shipping" in effect prohibits the use of mines for 
blockade. But such questions seem devoid of substance today.131 There can 
be little doubt that mines will be used for the purposes for which they are 
designed, which include the interdiction of shipping bound for enemy ports, 
and that such uses are unlikely to be challenged on the basis of an alleged 
incompatibility with the Laws of War-although challenges might be based 
on interference with the freedom of navigation established in the (peacetime) 
Law of the Sea.132 . 
The final matter for discussion in this chapter is the section on belligerent 
control of the immediate area of naval operations.133 Put briefly, the Handbook 
asserts a right to establish zones around naval operations from which neutral 
ships may be excluded, so long as such ships are not thereby denied access 
to international straits or to neutral nations, and within which neutral ships 
are subject to control by the belligerent naval commander; neutral ships not 
complying with orders in the zone, or engaging in activities benefitting the 
enemy (such as the carriage of contraband, or communicating military 
information) are liable to capture or destruction. Such zones were established 
by both sides in the Second World War, but it must be noted that they are 
different in nature and justification from exclusion zones of the kind 
established by the United Kingdom during the Falklands conflict. The latter 
did not purport to exclude neutral shipping; rather, ships therein were 
regarded as operating in support of the Argentinian occupation of the islands, 
and therefore hostile and liable to attack, unless the ships had obtained the 
consent of the British Government to transit the zone.l34 The zones were 
conceived as a means of dealing with the problem of determining the "hostile 
intent" of foreign ships which would justify the British Navy in using force 
in self-defense: mere presence in the zone constituted prima facie evidence of 
hostile intent. The legality of any action against Argentinian or other ships 
would by this view still have to be judged under article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter. War zones, on the other hand, claim to draw their validity 
from the Laws of War, and to the extent that action is taken in them which 
goes beyond the limits of lawful self-defense under article 51, their legality 
must be regarded as being at best highly controversial. The crucial provisions 
are likely to be found in the Rules of Engagement which supplement the 
account given in the Handbook. 
8. The Law of Naval Targeting 
9. Conventional Weapons and Weapons Systems 
10. Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons 
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11. Noncombatant Persons 
12. Deception During Armed Conflict 
The remaining chapters of the Handbook raise few issues relating specifically 
to the Law of the Sea, and will be dealt with briefly. Chapter eight includes 
a valiant attempt to salvage some sane and humanitarian rules from the 1936 
London Protocol after the savagery of submarine warfare during World War 
II. However, the obligation to place the crew of a merchant ship in a place 
of safety before destroying it is one which favors States with large navies 
at their disposal, and despite all the honorable intentions of the drafters of 
the Handbook, one is left with the suspicion that this is likely to be one of 
the first provisions to disappear in the downward spiral of violation and 
reprisals which has characterized all the major wars this century. 
Furthermore, the exceptions which the Handbook admits, allowing attack 
without warning of, inter alia, armed merchant ships,135 are likely to increase 
the danger to merchantmen. The arming of merchant ships may well be seen 
as a necessary and prudent step at an early stage in a conflict, especially if 
(as is the case in the recent Gulf conflict) merchantmen have been subjected 
to surprise attacks by light surface vessels. 
Chapter nine contains some interesting remarks on naval mines. Modern 
influence mines do not, of course, come within the literal wording of Hague 
Convention VIII, but the Handbook applies the principles enshrined in the 
Convention to them by analogy. The view that controlled mines may be freely 
laid during peacetime in a State's internal, archipelagic or territorial waters, 
or on the high seas or EEZ (provided that they do not unreasonably interfere 
with other uses of the high seas or EEZ) without notification, because they 
do not constitute a hazard to navigation, is noteworthy.136 
As far as international waters are concerned, this view is controversial. 
It might be argued that the sowing of controlled mines constitutes a threat 
of force, to be justified under article 51 of the Charter. Certainly, it is difficult 
to see the mining of international waters as anything other than a preparation 
for the threat or use of force, and such preparation may itself be regarded 
as an unlawful threat of force under article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, 
although there may be some difficulty in identifying the State against which 
the supposed threat is made. Such mining may also conflict with the peacetime 
Law of the Sea. The sowing of controlled mines in the EEZ of another State 
in peacetime gives rise to the argument rehearsed above concerning the extent 
of third-State rights in the EEZ; and if mining is regarded as an "unattributed" 
right under the 1982 Convention, the legality of which falls for decision under 
article 59, it is unlikely that a claim to a right to lay controlled mines could 
be supported except in cases where self-defense provides a justification. The 
laying of controlled mines on the high seas, with the proviso stated in the 
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Handbook, may also conflict with the Law of the Sea. If the argument 
concerning the breach of article 2(4) of the Charter sketched out above is 
~ccepted, such mining would violate article 301 of the 1982 Convention, which 
requires States using the seas to comply with obligations expressed in wording 
which follows the terms of article 2(4). Technically, this could be important. 
It might be argued that breach of article 301 allows other States to suspend 
the operation of the Convention in relation to the defaulting State.137 
However, even if this argument were to be accepted, it is unlikely to give 
States rights against the defaulting State which they would not otherwise 
enjoy under the doctrine of self-defense, the right to prevent non-innocent 
passage, and so on.l38 
These objections have little force in relation to the mining of a State's own 
waters, since laying controlled mines may be seen as a defensive measure 
which the State is entitled to take. Any such mines must not in fact constitute 
a hazard. If there is any real risk of injury to shipping from a controlled mine, 
once the mine is armed, notification would be necessary. Mines could, 
moreover, only be sown in a manner which did not have the practical effect 
of denying to foreign ships such rights of passage as they might have in the 
waters in question. 
Sowing armed mines is a different matter. Coastal States are certainly 
entitled to mine their own waters, subject to the duty to notify their location 
and not to hamper the exercise of the right of innocent passage except 
temporarily and in limited areas for security reasons. Mining international 
waters is a different matter. The International Court in the Nicaragua case 
characterized the mining of Nicaraguan ports as an infringement of the 
freedom of communications and of maritime commerce, and condemned the 
failure to notify the existence of the mine fields as a breach of the principles 
of humanitarian law.139 It did not decide that the use of mines in peacetime 
as a measure of self-defense is per se unlawful. The statement in the Handbook 
that international waters may be mined before the outbreak of armed conflict 
only under the most demanding requirements of individual or collective self-
defense, and subject to prior notification of the location and the anticipated 
date of removal, appears justifiable. Indeed, the tone of the passage in the 
Handbook is markedly more restrained than an earlier State Department paper 
on the subject.14o If the threat or use of force implicit in the mining is justified 
on the grounds of self-defense, prior notification is given, and the areas mined 
are not so extensive or so important to third-State navigation as to amount 
to an unreasonable restraint on the freedom of navigation, then the mining 
of international waters should be regarded as a lawful use of the high seas. 
The account of the legal limitations on mining in wartime, which follows 
closely the terms of Hague Convention VIII, is not controversial.141 It will 
be noted that the Handbook regards the emplacement of nuclear mines on the 
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seabed beyond the territorial sea as prohibited by the Seabed Arms Control 
Treaty.142 
By the time the lawyer gets to chapter ten, which deals with weapons with 
an unusual potential for causing indiscriminate and unnecessary suffering, he 
or she is likely to feel that the time for legal debate is fast drawing to an 
end. Experience of the wars since 1945 offers little encouragement to those 
who try to preserve in war at least the basic moral and humanitarian values, 
in whose name so many wars are fought. The prohibitions on the first use 
of lethal chemicals, and the use of biological weapons, are soberly recited, 
as is the prohibition on the targeting of civilian populations with nuclear 
weapons. The latter, in particular, will warm the hearts of those who find 
the targeting of enemy cities with long-range nuclear missiles morally 
repugnant and legally indefensible. The legality of the use of nuclear weapons 
against enemy combatants is, however, affirmed. Apart from expressing the 
fervent hope that these provisions remain of academic interest, and that some 
thought has been given as to ways of preserving in practice the distinction 
between combatants and noncombatants in nuclear exchanges, there is little 
that the lawyer can add. 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper has concentrated on the Law of the Sea in peacetime, because 
that is still the law most commonly relevant. Before closing, the central point 
made in relation to the section of the Handbook on the Law of War should 
once more be emphasized. The very idea that the Laws of War, in particular 
the eighty-year old Hague Conventions, remain binding is one which is open 
to serious doubt. The principles which underlie those laws and conventions 
no doubt remain valid, but there is much to be said for the view that there 
should be but one section in this Handbook, on the Law of the Sea, and that 
all questions concerning the use of armed force should be referred to the rules 
on the use of force and self-defense embodied in the United Nations Charter. 
The choice between these two approaches appears to be open, and the law 
unclear. The final decision in practice, which will in turn yield the 
authoritative answer in law as to which of the two is correct, lies in the hands 
of those in the United States and elsewhere who write and implement 
handbooks such as that reviewed here. Their practice will constitute the new 
customary law. As a matter of policy there is much to be said for the certainty 
and predictability which the detail of the Laws of War inject into armed 
conflict, minimizing the risk of unwantecl escalations of the use of force. But 
there are problems in reconciling them with the Charter and with the 
peacetime Law of the Sea, and those problems must be attended to. Peace 
is fragile enough without the opening up of a body oflaw outside the Charter 
to which States may appeal when the constraints of article 51 do not suit 
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them. The Handbook is an excellent starting point for the task of revising the 
Laws of War to bring them in line with contemporary law and contemporary 
warfare. That task is an urgent one. 
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